A Study and Recommendations on Fixing Colorado Higher Education Funding by Bamonti, Alyssa
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2012
A Study and Recommendations on Fixing
Colorado Higher Education Funding
Alyssa Bamonti
University of Colorado Boulder
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bamonti, Alyssa, "A Study and Recommendations on Fixing Colorado Higher Education Funding" (2012). Undergraduate Honors
Theses. Paper 247.
A Study and Recommendations on Fixing Colorado Higher Education Funding 
Table of Contents 
Topic Overview 1 
Research Plan  3 
Colorado Context  4 
Literature Review  6  
 Rising Costs of Higher Education  7 
General State Higher Education Funding  9 
Colorado Higher Education Funding  10 
What is associated with viable state higher education funding? 17 
Governance Structures  17 
Funding Models         19 
Higher Education Institutional Structures   23 
Ballot Initiatives  23 
Political Context  24 
Tax and Expenditure Limitations     25 
State Demographics 27 
Sustainability Measure   27 
Research Design 28 
Caveats to Data 32 
Hypotheses 33 
Data Analysis and Findings    37 
Case Study    43 
Recommendations 49 
Additional Research Suggested   52 
Conclusion    52 
Works Cited    56 
Bamonti 1 
 
Figures 
Figure 1- College Tuition Inflation Rates vs. General Inflation p. 8 
Figure 2- Colorado Funding Compared to the Nation p. 11 
Figure 3- McGuinness’ Classification of Higher Education Governance Structures p. 18 
Figure 4-Layzell’s Table of Desired Characteristics of Funding Models p. 22 
Figure 5-Description of Variables, Measure and Data Sources p. 29 
Figure 6 and 7-Regression Models p. 38 
Figures 8 through 12-Colorado vs. Louisiana Funding p. 44-46 
Appendices 
Appendix 1- Explanation of Regression Variables p. 54 
Appendix 2- Significance of morecolo and age structures in alternative model p. 56 
 
Topic Overview 
This research analyzes the impact of variations in state funding models for higher 
education on per capita, per full-time enrollment, and per 1000 dollars personal income spending 
for higher education; the goal is to identify a more sustainable funding model for Colorado.  
Colorado is currently among the lowest in the nation in per capita state funding for higher 
education. It is becoming increasingly more expensive to attend a Colorado institute of higher 
education. “Largely because of these funding cuts, tuition prices at public institutions have 
skyrocketed…The average tuition price nationally among public four year institutions increased 
26 percent” from 2001-2004 and 18 percent at community colleges (Priest and St. John, 
2006:11).   As of 2009 these cuts have caused in-state tuition to raise 9 percent for the University 
of Colorado in order to make up for a lack of state funds.  Across the nation, “Governors and 
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legislators have reported that they see higher education as a prime area to cut because it has other 
revenue sources” (Lyall and Sell, 2006: 9).            
State governments see higher education as a discretionary fund.  They cut from public 
institutions because they believe tuition revenues can make up for the lost funds. But in reality 
the tuition cannot make up for the lost funds at the current rate, so tuition increases, putting a 
greater burden on students while at the same time reaffirming the state’s perception that schools 
can get funds elsewhere.  This eventually creates a vicious cycle of increases in tuition and cuts 
to state funding; schools can raise tuition, so the state cuts more, tuition is raised more, states feel 
they can cut more, all while this burden lands in the hands of students and families. Tuition 
increases are the most readily available “solutions” to make up for a lack of state funding.  These 
increases make affordability very hard to achieve for colleges, putting a large onus on students 
and families to get through school on their own, incurring debt and hardships along the way. 
Affordability can be defined as the ability of students to attend institutions at reasonable costs 
without undue burden to the families sending them there.  Affordability can be examined through 
tuition levels and a student’s ability to receive aid.  In order to ensure that our colleges and 
universities are affordable this issue needs to be addressed as soon as possible.  
Higher education is becoming increasingly necessary in order to have a reasonable wage 
job in the United States and for the United States to compete globally. Funding cuts inhibit the 
ability of Americans to attend institutions of higher education, leading to a less able workforce 
for the future.  A major reason for going to college is to enter the workforce with the proper 
skills to contribute back to the economy and to those who invested in education.  These cuts run 
the risk of lowering the capabilities of the future workforce and drastically decreasing the 
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number of highly educated citizens.  “We could face the loss of a key national asset” (Lyall and 
Sell, 2006: xi).  It is fair to assume this is not a desirable situation for the future.   
  The overall long run consequences of these cuts are decreased opportunity for students in 
relation to programs and financial aid, lower educational prosperity of the school, and the long-
term risk to the economy of not having properly qualified students able to enter the workforce.  
This is why now is the time to address the issue of lack of state funding not only in Colorado but 
nationwide.  Since Colorado is among the lowest in funding and has a unique funding situation it 
is a prime case to assess and hopefully change.  Right now Colorado’s higher education funding 
cannot be improved or sustained because of Colorado’s unique funding structure, restrictions on 
increased taxation such as the Tax Payer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR), and continuing cuts to 
higher education.  My goal is to look at other state funding models for higher education in the 
hope that one or more could be adapted to Colorado to provide better, more reliable state higher 
education funding.  
 
Research Plan 
My research answers the following question:  What is associated with viable state 
funding for higher education?  My dependent variables are 1. Annual appropriations per student 
based off of full-time enrollment (FTE), 2. Annual appropriations per $1000 personal income, 3. 
Annual appropriations per capita, and 4. Percent change in funding over time (2000-2010) for 
each appropriation measure.   I look at state funding (my dependent variable) in all fifty states 
then run a regression analysis with each independent variable (also found in all fifty states) to see 
its effect on annual higher education state funding.  The independent variables include 
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governance structures and funding models, specifically performance funding and vouchers.  
These structures will be coded to determine whether their existence has an impact on funding. 
Other independent variables I will be looking at are unemployment rates and socioeconomic 
conditions in order to gauge the state of the economy, political context (i.e. political ideology of 
the legislature and strength of the governor), population, specifically age and education 
structures, the effect of ballot initiatives pertaining to education, and tax and expenditure 
limitations.  Viable funding will be determined by comparing percent change in state funding to 
the Higher Education Price Index.     
These data were collected from the years 2000 to 2010.  I use the regression results to 
discover what variables impact higher education funding.  Using my data set I find states 
comparable to Colorado, analyze their funding and governance models as well as the other 
independent variables as they exist in the state, and then determine whether their models could 
be successfully adapted in Colorado.  I will need to determine which of these, or a mixture of 
these, will be the most viable in Colorado and the most sustainable, meaning the funding has the 
potential to last for a significant period of time (more than ten years) and keep up with the rate of 
inflation for higher education costs.  
After looking at these factors I will make recommendations for the state of Colorado to 
adopt in order to improve higher education funding.  This may require policy recommendations, 
governance structural changes, a funding model overhaul, or a mixture of these factors. 
Colorado Context  
 Colorado has consistently been ranked among the last in higher education funding in the 
United States.  For being “one of the most educated states in the nation” it “does not perform 
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well in educating its own citizens” (Michelau, 2010:141).  This is known as the Colorado 
Paradox.  This paradox is partly in place because of the lack of state funds allocated to higher 
education institutions.  Colorado has a unique structure when it comes to funding education, 
particularly the measures in place that contribute to the poor funding of higher education.  These 
measures, TABOR, Amendment 23, and the Gallagher Amendment, “affect the amount of 
general funds available for higher education and leave it as the largest discretionary budget item 
that can be cut” (Michelau, 2010:117).  The Gallagher Amendment was passed in 1982 and 
decreases the amount of residential property subject to taxes when statewide residential property 
grows faster than nonresidential properties (117).  Property taxes are a main funding source for 
all levels of education, so this measure inhibited a major funding source of higher education.  
The next amendment passed was TABOR, the Tax Payers Bill of Rights, in 1992, which restricts 
government revenues and also restricted (until the passage of the College Opportunity Fund in 
2005) public higher education institution revenues and expenditures (117).  This measure 
returned $2 billion back to taxpayers from 1992 until 2005, when Referendum C was passed in 
order to suspend revenue limits from 2006-2010 and to readjust it for the future (117).  Also in 
line with tax payers’ rights is the fact that any increase in taxes, no matter how minute, must go 
to a vote of the people.  Amendment 23, passed in 2000, guarantees a minimum level of funding 
for K-12 education (not higher education) to keep pace with inflation (117).  This means that if 
K-12 funds are not meeting those levels money can be taken from elsewhere.  Seeing as higher 
education is the most discretionary of any of the general fund allocations, money is likely taken 
from its budget. These measures have and continue to have a negative impact on higher 
education funding and make it very difficult to increase that funding within the current structure.   
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Added on to the debilitating measures, there have been unexpected changes in leadership 
in the governor’s office and Colorado Department of Higher Education (CDHE), particularly the 
executive director position.  These changes have left the future of higher education policy change 
uncertain (159).  Changes, especially the CDHE’s Strategic Plan, that were being considered 
before the leadership shift were taken off the table in a sense.  Rather than focusing on long-term 
solutions to the higher education funding crisis, the Sustainability Subcommittee was forced to 
recommend short-term solutions to respond to the pending budget shortfall due to the loss of 
federal stimulus funds that the state had already used up (160).  This short-term solution was 
tuition flexibility, which I will discuss later.  Basically this measure gave institutions a lot of 
autonomy in setting tuition rates, which contributed to a lack of collaboration between 
institutions and the state.  In Colorado,  
the financial challenges that exist in tandem with a rigid tax structure, a unique higher 
education financing mechanism, and an extremely decentralized system, produces a 
context in which politics are unstable and powerful higher education institutions are 
concerned primarily with seeking more autonomy and additional financial support in 
order to maintain their survival.  Absent significant change in the tax structure in 
Colorado, this is likely to continue. (160) 
This context has created a situation in Colorado that cannot be fixed without an overhaul of the 
system and mending the relationship between institutions and the state. Without a change in state 
funding soon Colorado institutions will continue to increase tuition for both in-state and out-of-
state students to make up for the lack of state funds.  Until this change happens students will bear 
the brunt of the financial situation, paying higher tuition to institutions that have lost trust in the 
state to give them the funding they need to be successful, even to survive.  To ensure that the 
situation does not worsen, and for it to improve, it is crucial for policy makers to address the 
situation now and start finding long-term, sustainable funding options for higher education in 
Colorado.  
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Literature Review  
The literature on state higher education funding generally comes to the same conclusion: 
it is on the decline.  Some may believe this is not a large issue, that funding can be supplemented 
by tuition and federal aid to students and the state.  But it seems that most agree that something 
more needs to be done.  Specifically in Colorado there is much discussion on the need for better 
state funding but there is a lack of initiative in finding that funding model and taking the 
necessary steps to implement it.  That being said there is a lack of comprehensive literature on 
sustainable funding models for higher education that could be implemented in Colorado based on 
successful models in other states.  This is what I am hoping to contribute.  My research intends to 
move forward on ideas for better higher education funding structures to implementation of a 
better funding structure for Colorado that will help ensure the success and affordability of our 
higher education institutions.   
Rising Costs of Higher Education  
The cost of higher education has been rising since the 1980s.  Prices are continuing to 
rise more rapidly than the prices of other goods and services (College Board, 2011:8).  From 
2001-2011 published tuition and fees for in-state students at public four-year institutions have 
increased at an average of 5.6 percent per year beyond the rate of general inflation (3).  This 
number was 4.5 percent in the 80s and 3.2 percent in the 90s (3).  The table at the end of this 
section shows the rate of tuition inflation compared with the rate of general inflation from 1980 
to 2006.  Based on these figures “it would be reasonable to expect an average college inflation 
rate of 7 or 8 percent per year for the next ten years” (FinAid Page, LLC, 2011).  For the 2011-
2012 school year tuition and fees have increased 7 percent (excluding California) for public four-
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year institutions and 8.3 percent including California (College Board, 2011:3).  At two-year 
institutions tuition and fees have increased 7.4 percent without California, 8.7 percent with 
California (3).  In dollar amounts, in-state tuitions at public four-years average $8,244 across the 
nation for the 2011-2012 school year, $631 more than 2010-2011 (3).  Out-of-state averages 
$20,770, $1,122 more than the previous year (3).  Net tuition and fees at four-year institutions, 
which does not include money from grant aid or federal tax credits and deductions, increased an 
average of 1.4 percent per year beyond the rate of inflation from 2006 to 2011 (4).  This number 
may seem significantly lower than total tuition and fees paid, but it must be taken into 
consideration that “about one-third of full-time students pay the full published tuition price with 
no grant assistance” (8).  These students pay “an average of 8.3 percent more in tuition and fees 
at public four-year colleges this year than they paid last year” (8).        
Not only are tuition and fees increasing but other costs associated with higher education 
are increasing as well, such as textbooks and room and board, and grant aid is rarely sufficient to 
cover these costs as well (8).  A final factor that contributes the rising cost of education is the 
fact that people are just not bringing in as much income as they used to.  “In 2010, average 
income was lower at all levels of the income distribution than it had been” in 2000 (4).  Since the 
costs of education are constantly increasing and many states are continuing to cut funding and 
underfund education it is necessary to find funding models that can help students fund their 
education.  (Figure below is Figure 1: College Tuition Inflation Rates) 
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Source: FinAid Page, LLC “Tuition Inflation” (2011) 
General State Higher Education Funding  
Statistics and trends in state higher education funding are compiled by higher education 
boards, such as the State Higher Education Executive Officers, regional higher education 
commissions such as the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE), and 
higher education institutions themselves, like the Colorado State University system.  These 
reports give statistics on funding per student, revenue sources for higher education, state 
resources that affect higher education, and sometimes interstate comparisons in funding.  These 
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reports emphasize the importance of state funding as a policy issue in state legislatures today.  
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) lists affording higher education as their 
fourth issue in the Top 10 Issues of 2010 (ncsl.org). 
Tuition, state appropriations, and financial aid all interact to fund higher education 
(Baum, Bell, and Sturtevant, 2010).  While federal programs (i.e. financial aid) may be an aspect 
of higher education funding, the issue needs to be thoroughly addressed at the state level.  
Federal loans, grants, and aid can no longer be relied upon to finance higher education.   
“Despite the increased federal involvement, states maintain primary responsibility over higher 
education” (Michelau, 2010:5).  Unfortunately, however, “state appropriations to higher 
education have not kept pace with increasing enrollments; tuition has increased and grant aid has 
not kept up” (Baum, Bell, and Sturtevant, 2010).  “State funding for higher education institutions 
was 23% lower in inflation-adjusted dollars in 2010-11 than it had been a decade earlier” 
(College Board, 2011:4).  A decrease in state appropriations has led to an increase in tuition at 
many institutions, which then leads to a disproportionate reliance on federal aid to fund higher 
education.  
 The NCSL Fiscal Affairs Program report “State Funding for Higher Education in FY 
2009-FY2010” gives a general overview of the reduction of state funding.  In general, per full-
time enrollment (FTE) student funding has decreased from $7961 in 2001 to $6928 in 2009 
(NCSL 2010).  It also describes that higher education is largely looked at as a discretionary fund 
because of its abilities to compensate for lack of state support by bringing in its own revenue i.e. 
tuition.  But it is clear that raising tuition to make up for state funding does not help make college 
more affordable and puts a greater burden on students and families to fund education.  The report 
also outlines some measures states have had to take because of reduced funding, including 
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cutting programs, abolishing student aid, and decreasing enrollment.  Some states, however, have 
adopted more beneficial programs to protect higher education funding, such as creating higher 
education commissions to conduct studies, increasing tax revenues temporarily, and looking into 
operation efficiencies and tuition policies.  The report does not show how these programs have 
affected higher education funding yet.  The report also shows how the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act (ARRA) money has affected higher education funding; in states like Arizona 
and Colorado the money has made a significant difference in funding.  However, this reliance on 
federal funds causes problems.  The problem for Colorado is that these funds are rapidly running 
out.  These funds have backfilled previous year shortfalls rather than been new sources of 
revenue.  Reliance on federal funds and higher education as a discretionary fund will not lead to 
viable higher education funding.  This is especially true in Colorado’s case. 
Colorado Higher Education Funding 
Figure 2: Colorado compared to the rest of the nation’s funding 
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Source: College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2011, Figure 11b 
 
 In 2006-2007 Colorado ranked 49th in total funding per degree/certificate, with the majority 
of the funding coming from tuition and fees, not state support (Colorado Department of Higher 
Education, 2010).  Colorado also ranked 49th in 2008-2009 for average per student funding, 
again with most of our funding coming from tuition and fees (CDHE, 2010).  As the above 
figure shows Colorado ranked 49th in state appropriations as of 2010 per income funding, 
funding about half of the national average (College Board, 2011:19).  Since 2001 tuition as a 
funding source has nearly doubled for all institutions in Colorado (CDHE, 2010).  In 2009-2010 
the ARRA higher education appropriation made up $377 million of our $706 million dollar 
budget, while the state general fund made up $329 million (CDHE, 2010).  In making up more 
than half of the higher education budget the 2009 ARRA money, which was supposed to last 
until 2012, was depleted by the 2010-2011 fiscal year.  It was used to backfill the lack of state 
funds.  According to the CDHE, Colorado is on the path of accelerated erosion, which means, 
“Funding continues to decline, with other state needs taking priority.  On this course, funding 
would be less than $550M and could go to zero.  Any available funds should be targeted to 
financial aid.  Schools and programs may either close or be privatized, with no state support.  
Access will be limited.”  This is enough evidence to prove that there is a higher education 
funding issue in Colorado.   
      Now that we have assessed the dire situation, how can we move forward?  Numerous 
reports have emphasized the need for Colorado to look at alternative higher education funding 
models in order to benefit the state (Colorado State University 2007, Supporting Excellence 
2010, Penley 2006, CDHE 2010, Higher Education Strategic Planning Steering Committee 
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2010).  The Colorado Department of Higher Education has set forth recommendations to get 
Colorado back on track.  It has laid out some specific measures that may increase revenue, all of 
which rely on raising taxes and implementing surcharges or mill levies.  While these alternatives 
seem feasible, it takes a vote of the people to do so because of the Tax Payer’s Bill of Rights 
(TABOR).  This, in Colorado, is no simple feat.  Even if a ballot initiative this election to 
increase sales and income taxes passes these, raises would only last five years.  Then another 
initiative will have to be passed.  This is not sustainable. 
  The Higher Education Strategic Planning Steering Committee set a number of goals to 
help increase state funding:  
-Lessen geographic, economic, and demographic disparities in access, attainment, and 
opportunity to complete a broader array of quality educational programs. 
 -Strengthen the link between undergraduates and research programs and the state’s 
 economy. 
-Ensure fiscal stability and affordability of Colorado public higher education into the 
future. 
  -Provide recommendations for systemic governance reform. (HESP Forum 2010)  
Again, as with many other reports, these recommendations are quite vague.  This explains what 
could be done but does not give steps on how to do them.  The problem with these 
recommendations, besides their vagueness, is the lack of concrete, realistic steps to take to 
accomplish these goals.  The first recommendation is basically to increase access to college.  But 
how?  The second recommendation implies that research opportunities could benefit the 
economy.  But where will we get the money to do research?  Will the state pay for it?  The final 
two recommendations are where my research will try to find actions to support them and 
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hopefully ensure stability, since this forum does not ultimately do that.  This plan “served as a 
starting point for discussion between the new executive director and the governor, but thus too 
did not serve as the primary framework for the process (Michelau, 147). 
      Colorado also has a unique voucher program, the Colorado Opportunity Fund, which 
provides stipends to Colorado residents attending participating public (and a few private) in-state 
institutions, fee-for-service contracts to pay institutions to fulfill some state needs, and 
performance contracts with institutions as the principle mechanism for financing higher 
education rather than funding it through direct state appropriations (Prescott, 2010; WICHE COF 
Evaluation, 2010:i).  The system had three objectives.  One was for higher education institutions 
to be exempted from TABOR limitations on revenue and expenditure in order to be able to 
obtain more revenue, which would typically occur through tuition increases.  The second was the 
possibility that institutions would become more “disciplined and efficient in their operations” 
and recognize the need to recruit in-state residents (WICHE COF Evaluation, 2010:i).  The third 
was to promote access to higher education for underrepresented communities (i).  
  The required 2010 evaluation shows that the COF has not lived up to its expectations 
except for granting higher education institutions exemption from TABOR, which is beneficial 
but essentially means institutions can raise tuition, something could not be beneficial for students 
and their families.  The stipend itself, at $2400 a year per full-time student, or $80 per credit 
hour, is relatively low considering the cost of education has continued to rise.  It is also only 
good for 145 credit hours, which inhibits students from pursuing more education if they wish, at 
least in the state of Colorado.   
  Besides its logistical shortcomings WICHE describes multiple negative factors related to 
the implementation of the COF.  Colorado institutions have seen a drop in enrollment since the 
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implementation of the COF in 2005, although WICHE cautions that it is not necessarily a causal 
relationship.  In discussions with institutions they also discover that institutions will not be 
rewarded for higher enrollment and “did not perceive there were any real rewards or penalties for 
performance” therefore the COF has had a “negligible affect on institutional decision making” 
(ii).  This shows how the performance aspect of the COF is not functional.  The fee-for-service 
contracts were basically set up to encourage competition among institutions to meet state needs 
and be subject to “market forces”, but in actuality they turned out to be “a balancing tool to keep 
institutions whole with respect to the overall funding levels prior to the implementation of the 
COF legislation” leading to “no change in institutional behavior” (27).  The fee-for-service and 
performance funds can even be used to supplement a shortage of enrollment funds.  The 
Department of Higher Education is required to “provide estimated enrollment figures to the 
legislature upon which the COF stipend amount for the subsequent academic year is set” (28).  
More funds can be requested if enrollment exceeds the estimate, but the legislature is not 
obligated to provide these.  Overall, total revenue from the state remains the same, so some 
institutions take money from other aspects of the COF to fund the excess enrollment, further 
lowering the effectiveness of those two provisions.   
  In reality, according to Prescott’s 2010 evaluation, the COF generally led to higher out of 
pocket expenses for families and “necessitated a new apparatus to divert tax dollars through 
students and procurement contracts in order to give institutions the same amount of money they 
would have received if the state had continued subsidizing them directly. Though not terribly 
expensive to operate once implemented, this work-around process is not revenue-neutral and 
may ultimately cost the state graduates and widen gaps in educational attainment—exactly 
counter to its expressed purpose”.  The COF has created a new bureaucracy to circumvent 
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TABOR that has “diverted institutional resources away from student services, has not had the 
hoped-for effects on college participation, and is not revenue-neutral” (WICHE COF Evaluation, 
2010:32).  COF essentially will not solve the state’s funding issues and may contribute to them 
more.  It either needs to be gotten rid of or amended, as leaving it as-is is not a sustainable 
option. 
  Another option that has recently been implemented in Colorado to solve the funding issue 
is tuition flexibility.  Tuition flexibility involves giving universities autonomy from the state 
when setting tuition; “public colleges and universities would be allowed to raise tuition rates by 
9 percent annually. If an institution wants to raise tuition rates by more than 9 percent, it must 
submit a plan to the Colorado Commission on Higher Education that would show how the 
institution would make sure lower- and middle-income students would still be able to afford to 
go to school” (Goodland, 2010). Tuition could rise up to 9 percent a year if this was allowed. 
One of the provisions is that a good portion of the increased tuition would have to go to financial 
aid, but how closely will these provisions be followed?   Frank Watrous of the Bell Policy Center 
voiced these concerns despite their support of the bill; “The bill’s efforts to provide protection 
for access and affordability, and to reduce student debt load, also won the center’s favor.  
Watrous said the Center still had concerns about the 9 percent tuition ‘floor’ which in the past 
had been a ‘ceiling,’ and that a state model of high tuition, high aid doesn’t work when the aid 
comes only from the institutions. ‘The state still has to provide additional aid,’ he said” 
(Goodland, 2010). It is not the most favorable option for students and would cause implications 
pertaining to cost increases at colleges, cost that could increase every year. “’This isn’t a fix,’ 
said Sen. Rollie Heath, D-Boulder. ‘We’re last in the country on funding higher education.’ SB 3 
will get the state through another year, he said, but the revenue problems that caused the need for 
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the bill still remain. ‘We need to deal with the long-term problem,’ Heath said” (Goodland, 
2010).  The bill, passed in 2010, is up for review in five years, which was another reason why the 
bill largely passed. This is another short fix for Colorado.  It is not sustainable and is a measure 
that could further encourage decreased state support if institutions are able to raise more 
revenues and prove they can function without state support at the expense of students.   
 It is time for research to develop a concrete model that can be adapted to Colorado to 
provide viable higher education funding; it is time to be proactive in this situation rather than 
reactive (Baum, Bell, Sturtevant, 2010).  That is where my research comes in and fills this gap 
between ideas and implementation.  The ideal situation would be to get rid of TABOR, the root 
of many of the funding issues in Colorado.  But, as mentioned before, convincing taxpayers to 
raise taxes is easier said than done.  And even if TABOR was abolished there is no guarantee 
that the legislators would pass initiatives to raise taxes to support higher education.  But, if a 
sustainable, viable, adaptable model for higher education funding in Colorado can be provided to 
the state legislature it will make it a lot harder for them to say no to funding higher education at a 
rate that ensures the success and affordability of Colorado’s institutions.      
What is associated with viable state higher education funding? 
There is a vast amount of literature pertaining to what affects state funding for higher education. 
The following are variables I will be using to see their effects on higher education funding.  After 
assessing the literature and collecting my own data my goal is to find what factors can be most 
beneficial to state funding while also being viable for Colorado.  
Governance Structures 
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Governance structures pertain to the governmental arrangements states use to determine 
funds for higher education.  Aims McGuinness (2010) provides a classification of state higher 
education governance structures that will help with my classification.  He classifies all of the 
states by the boards and agencies that they have that have authority over higher education 
academic policy and budget.  The three broad categories are “states with consolidated governing 
boards, states with coordinating boards, and states with higher education service agencies” 
(McGuinness, 2010).  Consolidated governing boards have authority over both the academic 
policy and budget pertaining to the institutions they oversee.  Coordinating boards can be split 
into regulatory, where they have program approval authority, or advisory, where they only have 
program review authority.  These can be further split into their discretion over the budget, 
whether consolidated, review and recommendation, or no authority.  Finally there are service 
agencies, which have no program or budget authority, as well as one state (Michigan) that has no 
state higher education board.  Using McGuinness’ classification of each state I will determine the 
funding each state gives to higher education and see if there is a structure that better funds higher 
education.  Below is a table of McGuinness’ classifications. 
Figure 3: McGuinness’ Classification of Higher Education Governance Structures 
States with Statewide 
Consolidated Governing Boards 
and No Coordinating Board 
(except as noted *) 
Regulatory Coordinating Boards and 
Agencies 
Boards with Program Approval Authority 
Advisory Boards/Agency 
Boards with No Program 
Approval Authority – Only 
Authority to Review and 
make Recommendations on 
Academic Programs 
Higher 
Education 
Service 
Agencies 
 
No State 
Higher 
Educatio
n Board 
or 
Agency 
One Board 
for All 
Public 
Institution
s 
Two Boards 
Encompassing  
All Public 
Institutions 
Consolidated 
or Aggregated 
Budget (f) 
Budget 
Review and 
Recommenda
tion (f) 
No 
Statutory 
Budget 
Role 
Consolidated 
or 
Aggregated 
Budget (f) 
Budget 
Review 
and 
Recommen
dation (f) 
No 
Statutory 
Budget or 
Program 
Review or 
Approval 
Roles 
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Alaska 
(b)* 
Hawaii 
Idaho (a) 
Kansas (d)  
Montana 
Nevada 
North 
Dakota 
Rhode 
Island 
South 
Dakota 
DC (b)* 
Puerto 
Rico (b)* 
Arizona (m)  
Florida (a) (l) 
Georgia (n) 
Iowa (c)  
Maine (n) (e) 
Massachusetts (j) 
Minnesota (b)* 
Mississippi (c) 
New Hampshire 
(b)(n)*  
North Carolina (n) 
Oregon (c)  
Utah (n) 
Vermont (k) 
Wisconsin (n) 
Wyoming (c) 
 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
South 
Carolina 
Tennessee 
West Virginia 
(p) 
 
Connecticut 
Nebraska 
New Jersey  
Texas  
Virginia  
Washington 
New York 
(a) 
New Mexico 
(h) 
California 
(o) 
Alaska (b)* 
Delaware 
Minnesota 
(b)* 
New 
Hampshire 
(b)(c)* 
Pennsylvan
ia (a) (i) 
DC (b)* 
Puerto 
Rico (b)* 
 
Michigan 
(a)(g) 
 
States = 8 
plus 1*,  
and (DC 
and Puerto 
Rico) 
States = 13, plus 
2* (MN and NH ) 
States = 14 States = 6 States = 1 States = 2  States=2, 
plus 3* and 
DC and 
Puerto 
Rico 
States=1  
(a) State board/agency responsible for all levels of education (P/K-16/20). State boards/agencies in Florida, New York and 
Pennsylvania have coordinating, not governing authority for public institutions.  State board in Idaho has governing authority. 
(b) State has both consolidated governing board(s) and coordinating or planning/service agency. 
(c) One of the two boards is a statewide coordinating body for community colleges and/or postsecondary technical institutions. 
(d) Kansas Board of Regents is a consolidated governing board for universities and coordinating board for locally governed 
community colleges and Washburn University. 
(e) Maine Maritime Academy is the only public institution with its own governing board outside a system. 
(f) Several states, e.g., Texas Coordinating Board for Higher Education) develop the formulae for allocation of state 
appropriations and/or make recommendations for overall system funding but do not review and/or make recommendations on 
individual institutional budgets. 
(g) Michigan State Board of Education has Constitutional authority for overall planning and coordination of the state’s education 
system, but because of the Constitutional autonomy of the state universities and local governance of community colleges, the 
State Board does not function as a statewide higher education coordinating agency. State Board is the licensing authority for non-
degree vocational-technical education and proprietary institutions and approves charters for private degree-granting institutions 
within the state.  
(h) The New Mexico entity is a cabinet-level department headed by a Secretary of Higher Education. The department has 
authority to review, adjust and approve public university budgets prior to submission to the department of finance and 
administration and limited authority primarily to review and study but not to take formal action to approve academic programs or 
other institutional decisions. 
(i) Pennsylvania State Board of Education’s program approval authority is limited to specific areas (e.g., teacher education).   
Board also must approve new campuses or sites. Department of Education has budget responsibility for community colleges and 
regulatory responsibilities regarding for-profit institutions. 
(j)State-level governing boards in Massachusetts include the Board of Trustees, University of Massachusetts and the Board of 
Higher Education for other public institutions including community colleges. The latter board is also the coordinating board for 
whole public system. 
(k) Vermont has no statutory planning/coordinating entity. Vermont Higher Education Council is voluntary. 
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(l) Florida State Board of Education has responsibility for policy direction and coordination of state’s education system, P-20. 
Constitutional amendment passed in November 2002 created a Board of Governors for Universities, but the State Board of 
Education retains overall responsibility for policy coordination for all education. State Board of Education, through a chancellor 
for community colleges, coordinates locally governed community colleges.  
(m)  State law enacted in 2002 eliminated most powers of the Arizona State Board of Directors of Community Colleges except 
for data collection and preparing an annual report.  
(n) The two boards in these states include a statewide governing board for universities and a statewide governing board for 
community colleges and/or technical institutions. 
(o) Authority of the California Postsecondary Education Commission related to budgets is limited response to requests from the 
Governor and General Assembly for review and recommendations of budget requests of the segments (Community Colleges, 
California State University and the University of California) 
(p)  West Virginia has two state-level coordinating boards: the Higher Education Policy Commission for four-year institutions 
and the Council for Community and Technical Education for community and technical colleges. The council and commission 
share coordinating responsibilities including developing a public policy agenda that is aligned with state goals and objectives and 
the role and responsibilities of each coordinating board. 
Source: McGuinness, Aims C., Jr. 2010. “Classification of State Higher Education Structures.” Boulder, CO: National Center for 
Higher Education Management Systems. 
Funding Models 
Funding models that the governance structures work with will also be considered.  Daniel 
T. Layzell’s assessment of current and emerging approaches in higher education funding models 
will be a basis of my classification of current state systems as well as of the creation of a new 
funding model for Colorado.  Layzell emphasizes the need for flexible systems that are 
consciously thought out, not the result of inaction or default (Layzell, 2007:18).  He also briefly 
explains and assesses current funding approaches.  My job here will be to put the states in these 
respective categories and use his table to assess their efficacy.  The funding approaches Layzell 
discusses are incremental budgeting (the most traditional), funding formulas, performance 
funding, performance contracting, and vouchers (least traditional).  Incremental budgeting 
involves using the current year budget to start to set next year’s budget with adjustments being 
made “to allow for differences in activities planned for the next year and expected changes in 
revenues and expenditures” (2007:6).  It is practiced in some form by most state governments 
and uses line-item allocation.  Funding formulas “are mathematical algorithms used to allocate 
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some or all of the funding for public colleges, universities, and other higher education programs” 
and has been used in some way by 38 states as of 2006 (6).  Performance funding ties the 
allocation of funds to institutional performance on certain indicators, for example retention rates, 
graduation rates, and minority student enrollment rates (6).  If institutions meet targets then they 
receive a certain amount of funding.  
Currently about 14 states have implemented performance-based funding (PBF), but 
several others have considered it.  It has been promoted by notable organizations such as the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), National Governors Association (NGA), and 
College Board as an option that will improve campus productivity and boost college completion 
(Harnisch, 2011: 2).  “The theory postulates that [leaders of public colleges] will take the 
measures necessary to retain or enhance their institutions’ funding.” (2) I am weary of this 
theory, as I am not convinced institution leaders see the need for state funds when they are able 
to supplement them with tuition revenues. Harnisch reports key advantages and disadvantages of 
PBF.  Advantages may be greater awareness of campus performance, clarifying the relationship 
between institutions and the state so that state can set state priorities above institutional needs, 
enhanced transparency and accountability, and increased productivity (6-7).  Disadvantages may 
be a limited view of university performance, distortion of university missions which could 
include limiting access to some students, stressing efficiency over quality, lack of program 
support, and increased inequality and instability between institutions (8).  Despite some causes 
for concern performance funding may be a viable option in many states and cannot be ruled out.  
Performance contracting is similar to performance funding, but it requires a more specified 
service to the state from participating institutions (Layzell, 2007:7).   
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The final possible model is a voucher system under which schools would no longer 
receive direct funds from the state but rather eligible state residents admitted to a public college 
or university would receive a voucher to put towards the cost of attendance (7).  This may allow 
schools to set tuition and fee levels without state approval or even involvement (7).  The hope is 
basically that this system would increase competition for students between institutions and thus 
institutions would improve quality, cost, and programs (8).  As mentioned before, Colorado 
implemented this through the Colorado Opportunity Fund.  Its success is questionable and 
therefore it is unclear whether this model will be viable.  These models need not be used 
exclusively and may be mixed and matched.   
Layzell also includes a table of desired characteristics that funding models should have.  
The table below describes them.  This table will help assess which characteristics are most 
needed and viable in Colorado and, once those are found, help decipher which funding model (or 
models) would be best to implement.  The table listed below is Figure 4.     
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Figure 4 Source: Layzell, Daniel T. "State Higher Education Funding Models: An Assessment of Current and Emerging 
Approaches." Journal of Education Finance. 33.1 (2007). 
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Higher Education Institutional Structures 
Higher education structures are the way in which individual institutions are governed.  It 
is relevant to look at this information because it may show whether institutions are compelled to 
compete with each other for funding or if systems are more integrated.  It may also show the 
relationship between institutions and the state.  Institutions with strong decentralized governance 
may seek autonomy from the state in funding matters, or the state may assume these institutions 
have better funding capabilities and therefore may not be as hesitant to cut their funds.  More 
centralized structures however may have more oversight from the state and may have to or want 
to rely on state funds.  For example, Colorado has several systems of higher education: the 
University of Colorado system, the Colorado State system, Four-Year state colleges, and 
community colleges.  I would argue that these systems do compete for funding and while all 
would appreciate more funding, the larger systems (CU and CSU) have more ability to increase 
tuition revenues (relying less on state funds) than do the other state colleges and community 
colleges.  (That is not to say the CU and CSU do not need or would not benefit from more state 
funding).  Looking at these structures in the states may be a factor in determining why funding 
levels are where they are.     
Ballot Initiatives 
Ballot initiatives are important to look at because many of them pertain to fiscal policy 
within the state, especially in Colorado where any increase in taxes must go to a vote of the 
people.  The National Conference on State Legislatures has a database of all initiatives or 
referenda that states have passed on higher education and education for decades.  Thirty states 
have had initiatives that affect higher education.  The next step would be to look at the states 
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annual funding before and after the initiative (if it was passed) and see what effects, if any, it had 
on higher education funding.  It also may be interesting to look at if K-12 ballot measures took 
away from higher education funding when/if they were enacted.  Ballot initiatives also provide a 
unique opportunity for citizens to help dictate higher education policy, rather than relying on 
state legislators to vote on legislation.  “A New Funding Paradigm for Higher Education” 
mentions the importance of ballot measures within states; “Voters in 21 states considered the 
passage of several significant fiscal ballot measures in November 2010” (Pattison, et. al. 2011: 
6).  This “underscores the influence of the electorate in making major state fiscal policy” (6).  
The fact that voters could be more embroiled in the process brings in the possibility of political 
organizations, interest groups, and institutions themselves making more of an effort to impact 
policy through grassroots movements rather than lobbyists.  This civic participation could have 
its own impact on higher education funding.    
Political Context 
This includes the effect of partisanship, lobbying, and governor strength on state higher 
education funding.  The work by McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher entitled Partisans, 
Professionals, and Power: The Role of Political Factors in State Higher Education Funding 
finds “strong imperial evidence that partisanship, legislative professionalism, term limits, interest 
groups, and gubernatorial power influence appropriations levels” (2009:686).  They explicitly 
say what many may forget, that “public postsecondary institutions are embedded within a larger 
political environment...that environment will likely influence policy adaptation patterns in 
postsecondary education (688).   To summarize, McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher found that 
Democratic control is associated with positive funding levels, while Republican or unified 
control are associated with more negative funding levels (688).  “On average, a 1% increase in 
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Republican legislators is associated with a $0.05 decline in state appropriations per $1,000 of 
personal income, while a partisan change to a Republican governor is associated with a $0.23 
decline when other factors are held constant” (701).  They also find a positive correlation in 
funding when there are registered higher education lobbyists, equaling to about a five-cent 
increase per $1,000 of personal income (701).  This study also looked at gubernatorial power, 
finding that states whose governors have greater institutional power fund higher education at 
lower levels (704).   
Tandberg has similar findings.  He mentions that higher education lobbying “is acquiring 
greater influence within states.  Most universities, acting as a type of interest group, have either 
an in-house lobbyist or an outside contract lobbyist, and all public institutions engage in some 
form of lobbying” (2009).  This lobbying may have helped get more funding for higher 
education.  (Note: I decided not to look into lobbying efforts in the states for this project.)  He 
too finds than an increase in gubernatorial power tends to limit funding for two reasons, “first, 
governors often serve as a check against legislative spending; second, governors may divert 
funds away from higher education and toward other policy areas. Hendrick and Garand (1991) 
found that governors with greater powers were more willing to engage in expenditure tradeoffs 
(funding one area at the expense of another)” (2009). 
 Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) limit state tax revenues and/or the expenditures 
of state revenues.  Most of these limitations are amendments to state constitutions, meaning they 
are firmly in place and hard to change (Archibald and Feldman 2006:619).  Colorado has a TEL 
known as TABOR, which severely limits both spending and tax revenues “to the previous year’s 
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allowed collections plus a percentage adjustment equal to the percentage growth in population 
plus the inflation rate” and requires any excess revenues to be given back to the people instead of 
utilized by the state, unless citizens vote to allow the state to keep excess revenue (Waisanen 
2008).  This has caused problems in years following recessions, which have lower revenue 
collections (known as the ratchet effect).  The spending growth limitation limits “general fund 
expenditures to 6 percent more than the previous year or 5 percent of personal income, 
whichever amount is lower” (Waisanen 2008) and can only be amended by a vote of the people.  
In 2005 voters approved Referendum C, which allowed the state to retain all revenues collected 
between 2006 and 2011, when a new revenue base was to be selected.  TABOR is considered the 
most restrictive TEL in the nation.  Some advocate TELs because they decrease the size of 
government and contain spending and taxes (Waisanen).  Others fear that TELs inhibit “a 
government’s ability to fund public services adequately” (Waisanen), services that include higher 
education.   
The Bell Policy Center conducted a 10-year review of TABOR that decided that it has 
certainly limited government and that “education and health programs have borne a 
disproportionate share of cuts” (Waisanen).  Archibald and Feldman in their 2006 study found 
that provisions (TELs) coming out of the “tax revolt” of the 1970s do affect higher education 
spending (637).  They claim the necessity of acknowledging TELs when studying higher 
education spending because “tax revolt provisions account for a significant portion of the 
slowdown in taxpayer effort directed toward higher education” (638).  They also note the 
Colorado case as illustrative of the problems with severe TELs and higher education.  The 
problems are an increasing disconnect between states and public higher education institutions, 
since some state governments alone can no longer guarantee adequate funding, and the need to 
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compete for a diminishing budget, which requires arguing that higher education is more 
important than other state services such as K-12 education and healthcare, a difficult argument to 
make (640).  TELs seem to have a negative impact on higher education funding, but due to their 
rigidity they may be difficult to change in a timely manner to achieve better funding within a 
reasonable time frame.    
State Demographics 
  State demographics include migration patterns, socioeconomic conditions, and 
unemployment rates.  Migration patterns are relevant because they will indicate who is coming 
into the state and whether the state is attracting previously educated citizens or attracting 
students, which could gauge the state’s priorities in funding education.  It could be the case that 
states that already attract educated people would see funding as a lesser priority; why pay for our 
students when we already have other states’ smart people coming to us?  Patterns will also show 
the age structures within states.  Seeing these age structures could indicate how the state funds 
higher education; if there is a large student-age population (18-25 years of age) maybe the state 
would better fund higher education, or maybe there would be extra burdens to fund more 
students.  Socioeconomic conditions and unemployment are important to gauge the state of the 
economy in each state. The economy will determine the size of state budgets and where that 
money is allocated.  It is clear that the nation as a whole is facing hard economic times, but some 
states could be further recovered than others and therefore more able to fund higher education.  
 Sustainability Measure 
 Since I am looking for a sustainable higher education funding model it is necessary to 
define sustainability.  In order to be considered sustainable, funding will need to keep up with the 
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price of higher education.  Higher education has its own price index that is more accurate than 
using the general Consumer Price Index.  The Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) differs from 
the tuition inflation shown in the table in the rising costs of higher education section.  The HEPI 
is “designed specifically to track the main cost drivers in higher education.  It is an essential 
planning tool…helping schools to understand the future budget and funding increases required to 
maintain real purchasing power” (Commonfund Institute 2012).  It measures goods and services 
that higher education institutions purchase each year, which include “salaries for faculty, 
administrative employees, clerical employees, and service employees, fringe benefits, utilities, 
supplies and materials, and miscellaneous services” (Commonfund Institute).  (For more 
information on how the HEPI is calculated visit 
http://www.commonfund.org/CommonfundInstitute/HEPI/Pages/default.aspx).  This will be the 
tool by which I measure sustainability.  It will not be calculated by using a regression analysis.  
Instead I have created a graph comparing my case study’s percent change in funding over ten 
years to the HEPI yearly percent change (see figures 11 and 12).     
Research Design  
My design is a mixed method analysis that required me to find data on all 50 states in 
order to pick out states that can be compared to Colorado.  Independent variables include ballot 
initiatives, tax expenditure limitations, governance structures, funding structures, strength of the 
governor, politics of the legislature, educational attainment, educational enrollment, average 
household income, unemployment rate, in-migration, and age structures.  There are four 
dependent variables that will be assessed: annual state higher education funding per capita, state 
funding per 1000 dollars personal income, state funding per full-time-enrolled student, and the 
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percent change in this funding over ten years (2000-2010).  Each of the variables will be 
measured in the following manner: 
Figure 5:Variables descriptions, measures, and data sources 
Dependent 
Variables 
Description Measure Data Source 
Per Capita State 
Funding (2000-
2010) 
This is the 
appropriation 
states give to 
higher education 
each year per 
capita. 
It is the dollar 
amount that a state 
appropriates per 
capita for higher 
education. It is 
adjusted for 
inflation based on 
2005 dollars.   
Grapevine of the Illinois State 
University 
(2000-2009), http://www.ccpe.state.ne.us /PUBLICDOC/CCPE/Reports /budget/2011‐2013/Appendix%201.pdf for 2010 data 
Percent Change in 
State Funding per 
year 
(2001-2010) 
This will measure 
how state funding 
has changed from 
year to year.  I will 
be calculating this 
measure based off 
of the data I 
obtain. 
Measures the 
percent change in 
funding year to year 
or over the course 
of several years 
Calculated from Grapevine 
and SHEEO data 
State 
Appropriations per 
FTE (2003-2010) 
This is a common 
measure of state 
funding based on 
student enrollment 
Appropriations 
allocated based on 
FTE (Full Time 
Enrollment).  Also 
adjusted for 
inflation at 2005 
dollars.   
SHEEO  
State 
Appropriations per 
$1000 personal 
income (2000-2010) 
This is another 
common measure 
of state funding. 
It measures the 
amount the state 
appropriates to 
higher education 
per $1000 personal 
income and is 
adjusted for 
inflation using 2005 
dollars. 
Grapevine 
 
Independent Variables Description Measure Data Source 
State Higher Education 
Governance Structure  
This is how states 
make higher 
The states will be 
coded according to 
Aims McGuinness 
“Classification of 
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(2000-2010) education policy 
decisions.  There are 
5 possible categories 
of structures, with 
subcategories for 
three of them.  They 
are defined in the 
figure from Aims 
McGuinness’s work. 
their structure as 0, 1, 
or 2 in comparison to 
Colorado 
(Colorado=1).  In the 
regressions structures 
are coded as more 
Colorado (more=1, 
CO=0), Colorado 
(CO=1, not CO=0), 
and less Colorado 
(less=1, not less=0) 
Higher Education 
Structures”, State 
higher education 
websites 
State Higher Education 
Funding Model (2000-
2010) 
Funding models are 
the ways in which 
state governments 
fund higher 
education.  There are 
several types: 
Incremental 
Budgeting, Formula 
funding, Performance 
Funding, 
Performance 
Contracting, and 
Vouchers. 
I will determine 
which states fund 
with which model(s) 
using a coding system 
similar to governance 
structure.  I will code 
for only Performance 
funding and vouchers 
(0 being nonexistent, 
1 being existent), as 
all states have some 
sort of formula 
funding.  
Layzell’s “State 
Higher Education 
Funding Models. 
Daniel T. Layzell 
provides a 
comprehensive 
assessment of each 
approach, State 
higher education 
websites, AASCU 
Policy Matters 
report on 
Performance Based 
Funding 
Higher Education 
Structure 
This pertains to how 
higher education 
institutions are 
organized, for 
example in a 
centralized state 
system or several 
decentralized 
systems. 
This variable was 
actually not used in 
regression analysis 
but considered during 
the case study. 
Various State 
websites, Grapevine 
Migration/Population 
Structures (2000-2010) 
Includes in-migration 
numbers and age 
populations. 
The amount of people 
in each age cohort, 
which is condensed to 
two measures, age 14 
to 24 and age 25 and 
up, as well as the 
number of people that 
have migrated to the 
state that year. 
 
U.S. Census Data, 
Tax Foundation 
State Socioeconomic 
Conditions (Household 
Provides a measure of 
state wealth and can 
Average household 
income (adjusted for 
U.S. Census (ACS 
Survey Data) 
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State Socioeconomic 
Conditions (Household 
income data from 2000-
2010, educational 
attainment data from 
2005-2010) 
Provides a measure of 
state wealth and can 
give a sense of the 
economic status of 
the state.  Educational 
attainment is also 
considered here. 
Average household 
income (adjusted for 
inflation using 2005 
dollars) and 
educational 
attainment, which 
includes measures 
from less than 9th 
grade to graduate 
degree. 
U.S. Census (ACS 
Survey Data) 
Enrollment (2005-2010) Since one of the 
measures of funding 
is based of student 
enrollment it may be 
relevant to see how 
many people are 
enrolled at all levels 
in school in each 
state.  
This is the number of 
students enrolled in 
school, broken down 
from Kindergarten to 
College. 
U.S. Census (ACS 
Survey) 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
2000-2010 
The unemployment 
rate within a state 
will gauge the 
economic status of 
the state 
The unemployment 
rates will be input as 
is.  
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Database 
Gubernatorial Strength 
(years 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2004, 2005, 2007 from 
source, years 2003 and 
2006 found using the 
average between 
previous and following 
years’ numbers) 
A governor’s strength 
may affect higher 
education funding 
allocation, whether it 
is because of his 
party affiliation or 
political agenda. 
 
This will be measured 
based upon the 
governor’s overall 
influence in state 
government, which 
includes power over 
the budget.  This is 
measured on a 1-5 
scale, 1 being weak, 5 
being strong. 
 
Thad Beyle 
 
 
Party Control within the 
State Legislature (2000-
2010) 
 
This will determine 
whether the state 
legislature is 
dominated by one 
party or bipartisan.  
 
This will be measured 
using a 0-1 scale, 0 
equals a Republican 
majority, 1 equals 
Democratic majority, 
and 0.5 equals split.  
Both the lower and 
upper house will be 
measured separately, 
but the lower house 
will be used in the 
regressions. 
 
The Council of State 
Governments, State 
Elective officials 
and the Legislatures, 
now known as the 
National Conference 
of State Legislatures 
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Measure of 
Sustainability  
The ability to fund at or 
above the rate of inflation 
of higher education costs. 
Funding at or above the 
higher education inflation 
will be considered 
sustainable.  Funding 
below it is not considered 
sustainable. 
It will be measured 
using the Higher 
Education Price Index 
(HEPI) from 2000-
2010 compared to the 
percent change in 
annual funding for 
each state, 
particularly the states 
in my case study. 
Commonfund 
Institute 
 
After compiling all of the data I ran regressions to determine which factors contribute most to 
variations in state funding.  These factors are looked at in my case study.  State compatibility 
with Colorado is determined by similarities between the states, like population, as well as factors 
that affect state funding and whether those factors can or already exist in Colorado.  It is also 
necessary that the state chosen funds higher education at a higher level than Colorado and at a 
sustainable level.  The goal is that this will result in a sustainable and viable funding and 
governance model that Colorado could adopt in the coming years.  
Caveats to Data 
Ballot Initiatives (2000-
2010) 
Includes referenda, 
measures, 
amendments, etc. on 
state ballots that 
pertain to higher 
education funding 
The number of 
funding initiatives 
enacted between 
2000-2010. 
 
NCSL.org Ballot 
Database 
Tax and Expenditure 
Limitations (TELs) 
(2000-2010) 
Tax and Expenditure 
Limitations limit the 
amount of taxes state 
legislatures can spend 
and raise, which 
includes spending on 
education. 
These will be coded 0 
for nonexistence and 
1 for existence in 
each state.   
Bert Waisanen “Tax 
and Expenditure 
Limitations—2008” 
NCSL.org, State 
Websites   
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I have tried to be as thorough as possible with the data I have collected, particularly with 
the socioeconomic measures and dependent variable numbers.  Some of the variables I have 
coded, however, are extremely simplistic, particularly the codes for governance structure, 
performance based funding, and TELs.  Governance structures are more complicated than better 
than, equal to, or less than Colorado.  When looking at the case study, however, I will delve 
further into the comparison state’s governance structure to make more solid recommendations.  
For some coded variables it was hard to tell exactly when the variable occurred and whether that 
was before the 2000 to 2010 period or during it.  I did my best to look at legislation that enacted 
these variables, but some of the dates after enactment were assumed to have the same conditions 
as previous years rather than officially confirmed.  For the governor strength data, as mentioned 
above, some numbers were extrapolated from the existing data.  There were also some years that 
I could not retrieve values for, which may have skewed my regression analysis.  Finally, most of 
the data on appropriations were state reported and thus may be slightly skewed based on how the 
state reported their numbers.  It should also be noted that all dollar amounts used in my 
regressions were adjusted to equal 2005 dollars and that the percent change in appropriations 
were calculated from the 2005 adjusted numbers as well. 
Hypotheses  
For many of my independent variables I have hypotheses on what their effect on funding 
will be. They are listed and here briefly explained below. 
H1- The more consolidated a governance structure is the more funding there will be to higher 
education. 
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The governing structure in Colorado consists of a coordinating board (the Colorado Commission 
on Higher Education) that regulates the relationship between institutions and the state 
government.  When it comes to the budget this board really only has recommendation, not 
policy, authority.  They do not have to approve the state budget nor do they have to approve 
institutional tuition increases under nine percent.  Because of its lack of authority it has less 
control over the budget situation, and this type of governance structure will result in less funding 
for higher education.  States with consolidated boards with broad authority over the budget will 
tend to fund education better because the institutions have more of a direct relationship with the 
state (they do not go through a coordinating board). 
H2- States with higher populations between ages 14 to 24 (high school and college aged) will 
fund higher education more, while states with higher older populations (25 and up), will spend 
less on higher education 
States with more of their populations outside of the student age population (age 14 to 24) will 
have to devote more resources to the other age cohorts, such as funds for elementary education 
or funds for healthcare, which are generally not utilized for the student age population.   
H3- States with higher average household income will have increased higher education funding 
levels. 
If average household income can be a measure of state wealth, it can be assumed that states with 
higher incomes (more state wealth) have more ability to fund higher education at higher levels. It 
is another assumption to say that because of this ability they will fund higher education better.   
H4- A state with higher educational attainment rates will fund higher education at higher levels.   
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States may see the benefit of educating their own citizenry.  However, Colorado attracts an 
educated citizenry thus it may not see the necessity in educating its own citizens, which may be 
detrimental to higher education funding in the state.   
H5- States with higher numbers of enrollment at the college level will fund higher education 
more. 
This hypothesis is similar to the age structures hypothesis.  If a state has a higher college student 
population it may be more inclined to fund higher education more, while if elementary and 
secondary enrollment is higher that may take more of the focus.   
H6- A higher unemployment rate will correspond with lower levels of funding. 
Unemployment rates help to determine the economic health of the state; if the rate is high the 
state is likely struggling if it is low they are likely thriving.  Thus, if the state is struggling it will 
not fund higher education at high levels, whether it is because the state cannot financially or 
whether higher education is not a priority if unemployment is high. 
H7- States with a predominately Republican legislature will fund higher education at lower 
levels; states with a Democratic majority will tend to fund at higher levels.  Bipartisan 
legislatures may lead to lower funding.   
Republican ideologies tend to favor lower taxes and less government intervention.  Higher 
education funds from the state come from taxes and the state funding institutions is a form of 
government intervention.  Therefore, a Republican legislature may reduce taxes and therefore 
reduce funding to higher education.  It also may be more in favor of institutions providing more 
of their own funding than relying purely on state funding.  Democratic ideologies generally 
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support taxation and government support of services and therefore may be more willing to raise 
taxes to support higher education.  If states face competition between these two parties within the 
legislature funding may be in jeopardy because of the general ideologies discussed above and 
because a split legislature may have trouble coming to agreement on any policy, which can lead 
to little or no action by the state.      
H8- States with more higher education funding initiatives will fund at higher levels. 
Ballot initiatives allow citizens to get more involved with higher education funding decisions, 
taking some of the power from the legislature.  Assuming that citizens see the benefits of funding 
higher education, more initiatives may mean more funding.  More initiatives at least mean that 
higher education is on the citizen radar as an issue that needs to be addressed.   
H9- States with TELs will fund higher education at lower levels than states without them. 
Tax and expenditure limitations limit the state’s ability to raise and spend taxes.  Higher 
education funding is supported by tax revenues, thus if tax revenues are limited and the ability to 
spend them is as well, higher education funding will suffer.  With these limitations on spending, 
state governments must be careful with their allocations and must meet federally mandated 
funding in areas such as Medicaid/Medicare.  Since higher education institutions have the ability 
to raise their own revenue (tuition) rather than use the state’s limited revenue, higher education 
will receive fewer allocations as time goes on.  
H10- Performance based funding will have a positive effect on higher education funding. 
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Performance funding is the new trend in higher education, suggesting that there is something 
right going on with this funding model.  Louisiana, my case study, uses performance based 
funding and has significantly higher funding than Colorado.   
H11-In-migration will have a negative effect on funding. 
An influx of migrants can indicate that people are moving after they have gotten an education for 
jobs.  These people are likely already educated, so the state, like Colorado, is already attracting 
educated citizens and thus may not see the need in funding higher education.   
H12-A stronger governor will have some impact on higher education funding. 
Governors have a significant role in the budget process that states must go through.  Although 
the governor’s budget does have to be approved by the legislature, if the governor is strong he or 
she may have more ability to get his or her particular budget through the legislature.  Depending 
on their support for higher education they could fund, or not fund it, accordingly. 
Data Analysis and Findings 
To analyze my data I used Stata and conducted regressions to see the different relationships 
between funding and the various independent variables.  Age structure, enrollment, and 
educational attainment were highly inter-correlated; I used educational attainment in my model 
because it is a more useful and creates a stronger model than the other two.   Per capita funding 
and per $1000 personal income correlated highly as well, but I use models for both variables.  
FTE funding did not provide as strong a model as per capita or per income funding, thus the 
regressions I ran are based off of those two funding measures.  Below I have restated my 
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hypotheses and explained what the results showed after running the regressions.  Directly below 
are the regression models.  (See Appendix 1 for descriptions of the variable names). 
Figure 6: Effects of the independent variables on annual state higher education appropriations per capita  
  
Figure 7: Effects of the independent variables on annual state higher education appropriations per $1000 personal 
income 
 
H1-The more consolidated a governance structure is the more funding there will be to higher 
education.  
Governance structures that are considered stronger (more consolidated) than Colorado (coded 
more Colorado) are just below being statistically significant to both per capita and per $1000 
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personal income funding using the models shown above.  Using an alternate model that accounts 
for age instead of educational attainment, however, governance structures stronger than Colorado 
did have a significant positive relationship to both per capita and per $1000 personal income 
funding (see Appendix 2).  The model not shown here supports my hypothesis that a stronger 
governance structure funds higher education better than a weaker one.     
H2- States with higher populations between ages 14 to 24 (high school and college aged) will 
fund higher education more, while states with higher older populations (25 and up), will spend 
less on higher education. 
Although this measure was statistically significant in some models (see Appendix 2) it did not 
result in the strongest model, so it will not be considered further after this discussion.  The age 
population data was condensed into two categories, ages 14 to 24 and ages 25 and up.  This 
variable proved to be statistically significant.  Ages 14-24 have a positive relationship to both per 
capita and per income funding.  Ages 25 and up has a negative relationship to both funding 
measures.  This supports my hypothesis.  This model supports my hypothesis that an older age 
population would have a negative impact on funding.  This may be due to the need to provide 
other services, particularly healthcare, to older populations. It is also possible that older groups 
do not support higher education funding as much as younger groups do. (Note:  If I were to do 
this regression again I would use more specific age cohorts, like age 65 and up and age 18 to 24 
in the models to strengthen this hypothesis.)     
H3- States with higher average household income will have higher education funding levels. 
Average household income had a statistically significant relationship to per $1000 personal 
income funding but not to per capita funding.  The relationship to per $1000 personal income 
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funding, however, was negative, not positive as I hypothesized.  As income goes up funding goes 
down slightly.  This finding is also supported by my case study between Louisiana and Colorado.  
Louisiana has a significantly lower average income than Colorado but funds at higher levels.  
This underscores that higher education funding is a political choice, not determined by state 
wealth. 
H4-A state with higher educational attainment rates will fund higher education at higher levels.  
Educational attainment was also condensed into two categories: No high school diploma and 
high school diploma or more, which includes everything up to a graduate degree.  The high 
school diploma variable had a statistically significant negative relationship to funding.  The no 
high school diploma variable had a positive relationship with both funding measures.  This 
suggests that states with larger numbers of less educated peoples fund at higher levels.  This is 
opposite of my hypothesis.  I would assume that less educational attainment would correlate with 
less funding.  It seems that states with low educational attainment may see the need to fund 
education at higher levels to create a more educated citizenry.  This measure is interesting to 
think about when looking at my case study because Louisiana and Colorado support these 
findings.  Louisiana has a greater population with less educational attainment than Colorado and 
funds at higher levels. 
H5- States with higher numbers of enrollment at the college level will fund higher education 
more. 
Enrollment proved not to be statistically significant, but it was highly correlated with educational 
attainment and age, which did have significant relationships. 
H6-A higher unemployment rate will correspond with lower levels of funding 
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When controlling for all variables unemployment rate did not have a statistically significant 
effect on funding levels, which counters my hypothesis.  This is interesting because it may 
suggest that the state of the economy does not necessarily result in lower funding for higher 
education.  However, another measure of the state of the economy may provide different results. 
H7- States with a predominately Republican legislature will fund higher education at lower 
levels; states with a Democratic majority will tend to fund at higher levels.  Bipartisan 
legislatures may lead to lower funding.   
Party control of the legislature did not have a statistically significant effect on funding. 
H8- States with more higher education funding initiatives will fund at higher levels. 
Funding initiatives did not have a statistically significant effect on funding according to these 
models.  This suggests that funding initiatives do not generally make a difference in funding, 
proving that other actions need to be taken to make changes in higher education funding policy.   
H9- States with TELs will fund higher education at lower levels than states without them. 
TELs did not have a statistically significant effect on funding according to the models. 
H10- Performance based funding will have a positive effect on higher education funding. 
Performance funding was not statistically significant.  In regard to other funding models, I 
decided not to include vouchers into my model because Colorado is the only state that uses the 
system for higher education. 
H11-In-migration will have a negative effect on funding.  
In migration was not significant. 
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H12-A stronger governor will have some impact on higher education funding. 
Governor strength was statistically significant having a positive relationship with both funding 
measures.  This means that stronger governors tend to fund higher education in higher numbers.   
Several of my variables have shown to have no direct effect on funding.  However, I 
believe some of these factors may have a significant effect on funding in indirect ways, 
particularly party control of the state legislature, unemployment, and TELs.  These factors likely 
have significant direct impacts on state budgets and how the process works.  Higher education is 
a part of the overall state budget and while these factors may not shed light directly on higher 
education their impact on other parts of the budget may cause indirect effects for higher 
education.  Funds mandated by state constitutional amendments or by the federal government or 
TELs shrink the amount of money left in the budget for higher education, a sector that has 
already been established as easy to cut because of its seeming ability to raise its own revenue 
through tuition.  Unemployment hurts the economy, which also likely shrinks the size of the 
budget.  Partisanship may influence where legislators believe funds should go.  If higher 
education is not at the top of the list it may be cut or ignored.  Partisanship could also influence 
the legislatures willingness to adopt measures such as TELs that limit the budget.  While the 
model does not show the significance of these factors, further research into the budget processes 
of states may reveal this indirect impact on higher education funding.  
-Other Analyses 
In attempts to see if variables were interacting I created several interaction variables: 
TELs and years, performance based funding and years, funding initiatives and years, party 
ideology and years, and governance structures with performance based funding.  Interacting 
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variables with years was an attempt to see if the effect of these variables over time had an impact 
on funding.  Interacting governance structure with performance based funding was an attempt to 
see if the interaction of the two would lead to better funding.  None of these interactions had 
statistically significant relationships with funding. 
Case Study 
   Louisiana is an interesting case to compare to Colorado for several reasons.  It is 
comparable to Colorado on several contextual measures and has similar college enrollment 
numbers but has consistently higher, sustainable funding for higher education.  Louisiana also 
has a similar governance structure to Colorado (according to Aims McGuinness’ classification) 
and has a TEL, albeit a less restrictive one.  Despite its similarities however Louisiana has 
significantly better higher education funding than Colorado and has also kept up with the higher 
education rate of inflation (see figures below).  Its differences from Colorado make it an even 
more interesting case.  It has a slightly weaker governor than Colorado, a lower average 
household income, higher unemployment, and less educational attainment compared to 
Colorado, factors that would seemingly lead to less funding.  But my regressions show that lower 
average income and less educational attainment actually positively impact higher education, 
making Louisiana a good state to look at since its situation supports those results.  While I would 
not advocate for Colorado to lower its average income or de-educate its population, it seems that 
if a state with less wealth and education can fund higher education at a better rate, a wealthy and 
educated state like Colorado should be able to figure something out.  Louisiana’s governor 
strength mixed with its higher funding levels runs counter to my results, which is interesting 
because despite this seeming setback it still funds at a higher level than a state with a stronger 
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governor.  Because of its similarities and differences Louisiana provides a solid case study to see 
what Colorado could do to improve funding. 
Figure 8 
             
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
 
 
The independent variables as they manifest themselves in Louisiana that proved to be 
statistically significant in my regressions (age structure, educational attainment, and average 
household income) show that they do have the suggested effects on funding.  Louisiana’s 
governance structure and governor strength (other statistically significant factors) run counter to 
my regression results, but this makes the case all the more interesting.  It should be noted 
however that changing governor strength in Colorado will not be recommended because 
Colorado has a stronger governor so that is likely not the cause of less funding in the state.  
Louisiana’s governance structure is slightly different than Colorado’s, so looking into it more 
can hopefully give some insight into why its differences may result in more funding.  Higher 
education institutional structures are looked at in conjunction with governance structure because 
it is another factor that differs from Colorado and thus may contribute to better funding.  Other 
factors that were not significant in my regressions, such as performance based funding and TELs, 
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will be considered because they are factors that do not appear or are significantly different in 
Colorado.  They are also factors I feel can be adopted and/or altered.  Therefore, governance 
structure mixed with higher education institutional structures, performance based funding, and 
less restrictive TELs appear to be important factors in understanding Louisiana’s sustainable 
higher education funding model.   
A significant factor that Colorado lacks that may contribute to Louisiana’s better funding 
is performance based funding.  Louisiana has used performance based funding throughout the ten 
years of focus in this study.  Its funding model for higher education is a cost and performance 
model, calculated 25 percent based on performance metrics, 75 percent based on cost metrics.  
The cost metric consists of the costs of educating students in various disciplines at different 
levels in various types of colleges (Presentation to Louisiana Association of Institutional 
Researchers 2010), costs of general institutional support and student services, and operation and 
maintenance.  The performance metric is based off of student access and success, meaning 
completions, articulations and transfers, and competitiveness and workforce training. Colorado 
uses a cost model and does not yet have the performance aspect, but there are multiple reports 
and studies being done that suggest that Colorado is seriously considering adopting performance 
based funding measures (see CCHE’s 2011 discussion item “Examples of State Performance 
Models).   
The way budgets are formed and funds are distributed in each state may also be a factor 
in funding.  This distribution brings in the governance structures and institutional structures of 
each state.  Louisiana has four systems that run 34 public institutions.  The Board of Regents, a 
body made up of 15 volunteer members appointed by the Governor and one student member, 
oversees all of the systems “through statewide academic planning and review, budgeting and 
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performance funding, research and accountability” (Board of Regents website), setting statewide 
standards for higher education, and representing higher education in front of the government and 
the public.  The board also works with students directly through the Council of Student Body 
Presidents.  Funds in Louisiana are distributed by the systems to the institutions after the division 
and finance administration of the Board of Regents overlooks “annual budget proposals for the 
operating and capital needs of each public institution” and then makes its budget 
recommendation to the governor.  Then the governor’s budget must be passed by the state 
legislature (Board of Regents State of Louisiana website).  This body is comparable to the 
Colorado Commission on Higher Education, whose responsibility is to “develop long-range 
plans for an evolving system of higher education,” which consists of  two state systems (CU and 
CSU) and state colleges and community colleges (which are not under a unified system).  CCHE 
does not however work officially with students and it seems quite disconnected from the 
institutions in making policy.  It also seems less active than the Louisiana Board of Regents in 
creating institutional budgets.  The CCHE sets a rigid protocol detailed in the Budget Data Book 
(found on the CCHE website) which individual institutions are required to fill out after they 
figure out their budget requests, submit it to the CCHE, which reviews it and makes 
recommendations to the governor whose budget has to be passed by the state legislature as well.  
The Louisiana Board of Regents clearly lays out their uniform funding matrices that all 
institutions use and provide data for those measures in their formula presentation.  The CCHE 
does not have such a clear-cut resource available.   
 Colorado has some extremely limiting spending amendments, such as TABOR and 
Amendment 23, an amendment that mandates an increase in funding for K-12 education as long 
as personal income grows by more than 4.5 percent (Colorado Fiscal Policy Institute 2011).  This 
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amendment limits the funds available to other services supported by the general fund budget.  
Louisiana’s TEL is not nearly as restrictive as Colorado’s, as it is mainly a limit on spending 
rather than taxation (it limits some sales taxes, not a wide variety of taxes like TABOR) and can 
be changed by a two-thirds vote in the state legislature rather than going through voters (Justia 
US Law).  The relatively weak role of the CCHE and Colorado’s budget restrictions limit its 
ability to fund higher education.  Louisiana’s Board of Regents has a more authoritative role over 
the institutions and seems to work much more interactively with them than the CCHE does in 
Colorado.  Louisiana is also not as restrained by its TEL.  
Recommendations 
Comparing these two states one can see differences that can contribute to the differences 
in funding, particularly in governance structure, higher education institutional structure, 
performance based funding, and tax and expenditure limitations.  Colorado could benefit from 
altering these aspects in the following ways.  
1. Make CCHE a stronger body with more authority that works more directly with institutions to 
fix the disconnect between institutions and the state. CCHE should create a student board like 
Louisiana does to have more of an interaction with institutions.  The CCHE should also develop 
a database with institutional information such as enrollments, graduation rates, and tuition levels 
like the Louisiana Board of Regents provides and provide these data consistently, not on a need-
to-know basis.  These data will need to be collected by such a body if performance funding is 
going to be an effective model.   
2. Organize all of Colorado’s institutions under unified systems as Louisiana does.  This may 
help with reporting and universalizing the needs of similar schools, especially the community 
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colleges and state universities, which as of now are on their own when making budget requests.  
Organizing these schools under their own systems may also allow them to work with each other 
more to determine funding needs and share strategies.   
3.  Adopt a performance based funding aspect mixed with the cost model approach that 
Louisiana uses.  Abandoning funding formulas based on incremental or base budgeting is not 
realistic.  It is realistic to adopt a mixed model though.  I would suggest abolition of Colorado’s 
voucher program, but right now working under the constraints of TABOR it may be the only 
way for institutions to maintain some exemption from TABOR and ensure funding.   The COF 
thus needs to be amended to work with this mixed approach.  It needs to be adjusted each year to 
keep up with the rate of tuition inflation in order to provide adequate funding in relation to rising 
costs of tuition.   
This mixed model could meet the criteria of desired characteristics for funding models 
(see Figure 4, Layzell’s table of desired characteristics).  The cost approach would provide 
equity between institutions if calculated as Louisiana does, that is to account for “size, mission, 
and growth characteristics of the institutions”.  The cost model and performance funding would 
be adequacy driven, allowing institutions to determine what funding they need to achieve their 
goals.  They both would also be size and mission sensitive, responsive to changing institutional 
factors, and adaptable in the way that Louisiana lays out its funding measures.  Performance 
funding meets the goal based and incentive based standards.  The voucher aspect, if amended, 
may actually provide more of a concern with stability because it is an amount allocated directly 
to students at institutions and is not subject to drastic changes quickly.  Performance funding 
may bring an aspect of flexibility to the budget; funding can be denied if the institution does not 
live up to its performance goals, while the cost formula and voucher could stay the same from 
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year to year.   Vouchers also could provide supplemental funding for unique activities, 
particularly under its fee-for-service aspect.   
The mixed approach as Louisiana presents it is relatively easy to understand.  Colorado 
should make its funding strategies more transparent, which would allow for its simplification.  (I 
could not find a breakdown of Colorado’s model similar to the one found from Louisiana.)  Or it 
could simply adopt Louisiana’s model as much as possible.  This model seems to use reliable 
data obtained by the Board of Regents data systems, the Southern Regional Education Board 
Data Exchange, and institutional reports on their individual needs.  CCHE does do a lot of 
research, but they do not have their own data systems on Colorado’s institutions.  This could be a 
beneficial addition to CCHE’s work.  Adopting a mixed model using multiple approaches can 
provide flexibility and balance.  Colorado should seriously consider adopting a performance 
funding aspect with its cost model and, if amended to keep up with the rising costs of higher 
education and not solely relied on to fund higher education, the voucher system could be a 
working addition to the funding model.  This interactive approach, if it adopts Louisiana’s cost 
and performance matrices as well, could actually meet most if not all of Layzell’s desired 
characteristics for a sustainable funding model.     
4.  Lightening the restrictions under TABOR, possibly making them more like Louisiana’s TEL, 
or amending or abolishing spending restrictions altogether could help create more funding.  
Institutions have to jump through hoops to try and become exempt from some TABOR 
restrictions.  That is what the COF was meant to do for higher education, but as the evaluation 
suggests it is not really working as it was meant to.  As mentioned above, the COF can be 
amended to work within TABOR restrictions but to keep up with rising educational costs.  If 
Colorado is forced to work under a TEL, since abolishing it would be an extremely difficult feat, 
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TABOR could be amended to be less rigid with spending and taxation limitations.  Referendum 
C was a step in the right direction, but it did not manifest into more funding for higher education 
thus more TABOR reform will be necessary if higher education funding is going to survive and 
improve under a limitation that restricts state budgets.      
Additional Research Suggested 
 While my recommendations make a stride towards finding a way to improve funding in 
Colorado, specifically in suggesting structural changes that work within limitations to the state 
budget, more needs to be done.  Ultimately TABOR and its subsequent amendments need to be 
seriously revised to allow for a more flexible state budget.  But since this is such a large feat 
there are other areas where research could be done to work around TABOR.  Current evaluations 
of the Colorado Opportunity Fund suggest that Colorado needs to look at other ways to work 
around the limitations of TABOR because the current voucher system is not doing enough.  If 
this voucher system is the answer, more research needs to make a more dynamic system, 
particularly one that keeps up with rising tuition.   
Another area of research necessary to be done to work within TABOR would be to look 
into state budget allocations and see how those could be rearranged to provide more equal 
funding for higher education.  I am predicting this will require reallocating funds from portions 
of the general fund such as corrections and transportation.  This research could constitute a thesis 
in itself, so I will end with saying that state budget priorities may need to change if higher 
education funding is to improve.     
Conclusion 
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 This project was meant to shed light on the diminishing state of higher education funding 
in the United States and the rising costs of higher education, specifically in Colorado.  It was also 
meant to offer some solutions to this worsening problem for Colorado specifically, but the ideas 
and regression results are applicable to all states.  The idea is that incremental changes in the 
higher education structures and funding models can contribute to improving state higher 
education funding, even if states are working within certain factors that are hard to change, such 
as socioeconomic factors and tax and expenditure limitations.   
My research required me to research variables and funding in all 50 states, run 
regressions on those variables to see their effect on higher education funding, and apply those 
variables to my case study (see table under Research Design).  Two of my hypotheses were 
confirmed, two were reversed, confirming the alternate hypothesis, and five were not significant 
according to the regression models.  I argue, however, that a few of the statistically insignificant 
factors have a direct impact on state budgets and thus an indirect impact on higher education 
funding, so they are still important to consider.  
 To choose my case study I had to analyze the data set I created to find a state comparable 
to Colorado but with higher, sustainable funding for higher education.  I found that Louisiana has 
a more dynamic funding model and a stronger coordinating board in its governance structure that 
worked closely with the institutions to create a strong connection between the state and higher 
education systems and institutions.  Louisiana is working within a TEL like Colorado, but is able 
to be successful in doing so in part due to the fact that their TEL is much less restrictive than 
Colorado’s TABOR.  I then proceeded to make recommendations for Colorado to implement to 
improve higher education funding, which include strengthening the Colorado Commission on 
Higher Education, putting all of Colorado’s institutions under systems, adopting performance 
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based funding in addition to a cost model, amending its current voucher system or abolishing it 
altogether, and considering actions to amend TABOR to lighten the limitations it puts on the 
state budget if it cannot be gotten rid of.  Finally I outlined some additional research that could 
be done to further help the funding situation in Colorado. 
My hope is that this research contributes to solving the problem of higher education 
funding in Colorado and in the United States.  It shows specific factors that affect funding and 
factors that can be altered to improve funding.  The ultimate confirmation of this study would be 
for Colorado to implement my recommendations and in doing so funding would be improved.  
Higher education is vital to the success of the United States.  It should be accessible to as many 
people as possible.  With decreased state support tuitions have increased which hurts higher 
education accessibility.  All states need to ensure adequate higher education funding to support 
institutions and citizens.  Colorado in particular needs to focus on this issue and find a solution 
soon to avoid further detriment to higher education funding in the state.       
Appendix 1: Explanation of Regression Variables 
Independent Variable 
Name 
Measure t w/ 
Per 
$1000 
income 
t w/ 
Per 
capita 
Beta w/ Per 
$1000 income 
Beta 
w/ Per 
Capita 
hincgdpadjusted Average 
household 
income adjusted 
for inflation  
-3.96 NS -.3232 NS 
performancefunding Performance 
Funding 
NS NS NS NS 
unemploymentrate Unemployment 
Rate 
NS NS NS NS 
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partyideologylowerhouse Party control of 
the lower house 
of the 
legislature 
NS NS NS NS 
govstrength Governor 
Strength 
3.02 2.70 .2349 .2384 
fundinginitiative Funding 
Initiatives 
NS NS NS NS 
tels Tax and 
Expenditure 
Limitations 
(TELs) 
NS NS NS NS 
morecolo Governance 
Structure 
considered 
stronger than 
Colorado’s 
NS NS NS NS 
hsdiploma Educational 
Attainment of 
high school 
diploma and 
everything 
above up to a 
graduate degree 
-5.05 -3.91 -1.755 -1.546 
nohsdiploma Educational 
Attainment of 
no high school 
diploma 
4.72 3.83 1.614 1.488 
Dependent Variable Name Meaning  Adjusted R2 
perincgdpadjusted State funding measured 
per $1000 personal 
income adjusted for 
inflation  
0.3199 
percapitagdpadjusted State funding measured 
per capita adjusted for 
inflation 
0.1214 
NS=Not Statistically Significant 
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Appendix 2: Significance of morecolo and age structures in alternative model 
Variable t w/ Per 
$1000 
income 
t w/ Per 
capita 
Beta w/ 
Per 
$1000 
income 
Beta w/ 
Per 
Capita 
morecolo 2.06 2.12 .1035 .1141 
Age 14 to 24 6.24 5.04 2.647 2.300 
Age 25 and up -6.59 -5.13 -2.815 -2.354 
Adjusted R2 for Per $1000 personal income model= 0.2278 
Adjusted R2 for Per capita model=0.1079 
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